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THE COMMON LAW OF 
FOREIGN 
OFFICIAL IMMUNITY 
Chimène I. Keitner† 
N SAMANTAR V. YOUSUF, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously 
rejected the argument that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities 
Act (FSIA) should be read to encompass all suits brought 
against individual foreign officials for acts performed in an offi-
cial capacity.1 The Court held that when plaintiffs sue a current or 
former foreign official “in his personal capacity and seek damages 
from his own pockets,” the suit “is not a claim against a foreign state 
as the Act defines that term.”2 Instead, an individual defendant’s 
immunity “is properly governed by the common law.”3 
                                                                                                
† Chimène Keitner is an Associate Professor of Law at the University of California, Hastings 
College of the Law. She represented Professors of Public International Law and Comparative 
Law as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents in Samantar v. Yousuf, No. 08-1555. 
Copyright © 2010 Chimène Keitner. 
1 See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Foreign Sovereign Immunity, Individual 
Officials, and Human Rights Litigation, 13 GREEN BAG 2D 9 (2009). 
2 No. 08-1555 (decided June 1, 2010), slip op. at 19.  
3 Id. The Court noted that “it may be the case that some actions against an official in 
his official capacity should be treated as actions against the foreign state itself, as 
the state is the real party in interest,” id., following the basic model of official 
capacity suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In such a case, the named official could 
invoke common law immunity. See Chimène I. Keitner, Officially Immune? A Re-
sponse to Bradley and Goldsmith, 36 YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE 1, 4 (2010). 
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As commentators quickly pointed out,4 and as the Court itself 
acknowledged,5 holding that the common law governs foreign offi-
cial immunity does not end debates about the contours of such im-
munity, or which branch of government should define them. The 
opinion in Samantar discussed but did not resolve these debates, 
leaving them in the first instance to the lower courts.  
Immunity from jurisdiction is the exception, not the rule. 
Courts and commentators have become accustomed to speaking of 
“exceptions” to foreign sovereign immunity because the FSIA grants 
immunity to foreign states, and then carves out a series of excep-
tions to that immunity. As Samantar makes clear, this statutory 
framework only applies to claims against foreign states themselves. 
When it comes to natural persons, the United States maintains “ex-
clusive and absolute” jurisdiction over its own territory and the in-
dividuals who enter it.6 The limited jurisdictional immunities ac-
corded to foreign officials derogate from this baseline.  
Individual immunities fall into two categories: status-based im-
munities, which enable certain incumbent foreign officials to per-
form their duties unencumbered by legal proceedings; and conduct-
based immunities, which shield individuals from legal consequences 
for some – but not all – acts performed on behalf of the state during 
their tenure in office. Not all acts performed under color of foreign 
law benefit from conduct-based immunity, even if those acts are 
also attributable to the foreign state.  
International law, and many countries’ domestic laws, impose 
individual responsibility on officials who commit acts such as war 
crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity, even when they 
commit these acts in their official capacities. Conduct-based immu-
nity does not automatically shield individual defendants from the 
                                                                                                
4 See David P. Stewart, Samantar v. Yousuf: Foreign Official Immunity Under Com-
mon Law, 14 ASIL INSIGHT No. 15 (June 14, 2010), at www.asil.org/files/in-
sight100614pdf.pdf; Curtis A. Bradley, Samantar Insta-Symposium: Samantar and 
Foreign Official Immunity (June 2, 2010), at opiniojuris.org/2010/06/02/saman-
tar-insta-symposium-samantar-and-foreign-official-immunity/. 
5 Samantar, slip op. at 15 & 15 n.15. 
6 See Schooner Exchange v. M’Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812).  
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legal consequences of these acts, whether in the form of criminal 
penalties or civil damages. The state’s immunity does not necessar-
ily prevent imposing legal consequences on the individual, where 
the individual also bears responsibility for the act. 
Under the U.S. Constitution, the Executive Branch determines 
whether an individual is entitled to claim status-based immunity as a 
current diplomat or incumbent head of state. When individual de-
fendants assert conduct-based immunity, courts will have to reason 
based on principles derived from historical and contemporary prac-
tice, Executive Branch input, and relevant domestic analogies. Al-
though dismissing all human rights claims on immunity grounds 
might be an efficient way to clear the docket of these cases, neither 




n adjudicating claims to immunity, courts must first determine 
what kind of immunity the defendant is asserting. International 
law differentiates between immunity ratione personae (personal im-
munity, or what I call “status-based” immunity) and immunity ra-
tione materiae (functional immunity, or what I call “conduct-based” 
immunity). Status-based immunity shields individuals from legal 
proceedings while they occupy certain offices, to avoid interference 
with their ability to perform official functions. Conduct-based im-
munity shields individuals from legal consequences for certain acts, 
whether or not the individuals are still in office, because those acts 
are considered acts of the state, rather than acts of the individual. 
Two categories of current officials may claim status-based im-
munity: diplomats and heads of state. Diplomatic immunity shields 
diplomats (or “public ministers”) who have been accredited by the 
receiving state from criminal and most civil proceedings during 
their appointment, unless such immunity is waived by the sending 
state.7 Such immunity also extends to certain accredited members 
                                                                                                
7 See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 
I 
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of U.N. Missions8 and certain members of “special diplomatic mis-
sions.”9 Head of state immunity shields incumbent heads of state 
from the judicial processes of foreign courts, and has also been in-
terpreted as extending to incumbent foreign ministers.10 Status-
based immunity attaches to an individual by virtue of his or her cur-
rent official position, regardless of the substance of the claim. Con-
sular immunity is not status-based, because consular officials only 
enjoy immunity for the exercise of consular functions, and not for 
any other activities.11 
Status-based immunity only lasts during an individual’s tenure in 
office.12 Former diplomats and former heads of state, as well as 
other current and former officials, may not claim status-based im-
munity. Instead, they may claim conduct-based immunity for cer-
                                                                                                
T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 96 (entered into force with respect to the 
United States on Dec. 13, 1972), Art. 31(1) & Art. 32.  
8 See Section 15 of the Headquarters Agreement between the United States and the 
United Nations, 22 U.S.C. § 287.  
9 Suggestion of Immunity and Statement of Interest of the United States, Li Weixun 
v. Bo Xilai, Civ. No. 04-0649 (D.D.C. July 24, 2006) at 4; see also id. at 11 n.9 
(indicating that “[s]pecial mission immunity would not, however, encompass all 
foreign official travel”). 
10 See Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of 
the Congo v. Belgium), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, at ¶ 53-54 (Feb. 14, 2002) 
(finding that the incumbent Congolese foreign minister was entitled to status-
based immunity from criminal prosecution by a Belgian court because, like an 
incumbent head of state, an incumbent foreign minister is entitled to protection 
“throughout the duration of his or her office” from “any act of authority of an-
other State which would hinder him or her in the performance of his or her du-
ties”).  
11 See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 
U.N.T.S. 261, Art. 43(1) (providing immunity for current consular officials only 
for “acts performed in the exercise of consular functions”). While the Supreme 
Court in Samantar characterized both diplomatic and consular immunities as “po-
sition-based individual immunities,” slip op. at 13 n.12, consular immunity is 
“position-based” only in the sense that one must be a consular official in order to 
claim it. Cf. id., slip op. at 6 n.6 (instead using the term “specialized immunities,” 
as that term is used in the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the 
United States § 66, Comment b (1964-1965)). 
12 See Arrest Warrant Case ¶ 54. 
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tain acts performed on behalf of the state.13 Conduct-based immu-
nity prevents an individual from incurring legal consequences for 
certain acts, regardless of the individual’s current or former posi-
tion. 
The distinction between status-based immunity (ratione personae) 
and conduct-based immunity (ratione materiae) is firmly established 
as a matter of international law. Even so, courts and commentators 
sometimes fail to differentiate between these two categories. This 
can lead to confusing analysis and incorrect results. For example, 
the district court in Abiola v. Abubakar held that the defendant Abu-
bakar, who had previously occupied successive high-level positions 
in the Nigerian military regime, was “entitled to head-of-state im-
munity for his acts [including atrocities] during the period that he 
was Nigeria’s head of state.”14 The court confused status-based im-
munity, which shields incumbent heads of state from legal proceed-
ings, with conduct-based immunity, which shields an individual 
from legal consequences for certain acts performed during his or 
her tenure as head of state even after that individual has left office. 
Having found that Abubakar was entitled to “head-of-state immu-
nity” for acts performed during his tenure as head of state, the dis-
trict court found that Abubakar was not entitled to immunity for the 
same acts performed during his tenure as Chief of Defense Staff. 
(The court of appeals upheld the finding of no immunity for acts 
performed while Abubakar was Chief of Defense Staff, but it did 
not revisit the issue of head of state immunity because the plaintiffs 
did not contest that finding.15) This does not make sense because, as 
a former head of state, Abubakar was not entitled to status-based 
immunity. Any claim to immunity could only have been conduct-
based. Because Abubakar was not an incumbent head of state at the 
time of the legal proceedings, the court’s assessment of his entitle-
                                                                                                
13 For consular officials and former diplomats, see Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261, Art. 53(4); Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Art. 39(2). 
14 Abiola v. Abubakar, 267 F. Supp. 2d 907, 916 (N.D. Ill. 2003). 
15 Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 879 (7th Cir. 2005). 
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ment to immunity should have focused on the nature of his alleged 
conduct, not on which title he held at the time that conduct oc-
curred. 
More recently, the United States filed an amicus brief in Saman-
tar that fails to distinguish between precedents involving status-
based immunity and those involving conduct-based immunity. Be-
cause it does not differentiate between these categories, the brief 
makes overly broad statements about conduct-based immunity 
based on cases involving status-based immunity. In discussing con-
duct-based immunity,16 the U.S. brief cites The Schooner Exchange 
and Jones v. Letombe in support of the historical assertion that courts 
“have long recognized foreign official immunity in a variety of con-
texts.”17 However, neither The Schooner Exchange nor Jones v. Letombe 
involved an individual’s conduct-based immunity from jurisdiction 
based on the official nature of his acts. The cited passage from The 
Schooner Exchange deals exclusively with the status-based immunity of 
current diplomats (“foreign ministers”) and heads of state (“the per-
son of the sovereign”), and says nothing about conduct-based im-
munity.18 Jones v. Letombe also involved status-based immunity. In 
that case, French consul-general Joseph Letombe was deemed not 
to be immune from U.S. jurisdiction because he was not a diplo-
mat, and he was compelled to post a hefty bail.19 The Letombe case 
shows that claims of immunity do not automatically preclude the 
exercise of jurisdiction over foreign officials who are neither diplo-
                                                                                                
16 Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance, Samantar v. 
Yousuf, No. 08-1555 (U.S. argued Mar. 3, 2010) [hereafter U.S. Samantar Brief] 
at 11 (discussing immunity of foreign officials “based on the official character of 
their acts”). 
17 U.S. Samantar Brief at 10. 
18 See id., citing The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 138 (1812). 
19 See U.S. Samantar Brief at 10, citing Jones v. Letombe, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 384, 385 
(1798); cf. 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 77 (1797) (indicating that Letombe “was not privi-
leged from legal process, either by the general law of nations, or by the consular 
convention between the United States and France); Maeva Marcus, ed., 8 THE 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-
1800, 77 (2007) (indicating that Letombe was forced to post $90,000 bail). 
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mats nor heads of state. The suit was allowed to proceed, even 
though Letombe was ultimately adjudged to have been acting on 
behalf of the French government in signing bills of exchange, and 
thus not personally liable for the French Republic’s debts.  
The United States’s amicus brief in Samantar also cites two At-
torney General opinions from the 1790’s for the proposition that 
the Executive has deemed foreign officials immune from suit for 
acts performed “‘in the exercise of governmental authority.’”20 
However, these two opinions do not support that proposition. In-
stead, the opinions state that, regardless of the merits of the respec-
tive suits (about which the Attorneys General expressed doubt), the 
individual defendants – a former Governor of the French colony of 
Guadeloupe and a British privateer, respectively – were “with re-
spect to [their] suability, on a footing with every other foreigner 
(not a public minister) who comes within the jurisdiction of our 
courts.”21 Like the French consul-general Letombe, former Gover-
nor Victor Collot and Captain Henry Sinclair were not immune 
from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts. 
Secretary of State Timothy Pickering emphasized this lack of 
immunity in a letter to consul-general Letombe about the suit 
against former Governor Collot. Pickering explained to Letombe 
that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had held the former Gov-
ernor to bail because he “refused, as I am informed, to say anything 
more than that he was, at the time [of the alleged act], the Governor 
of Guadeloupe: as though a Governor could commit no unlawful act 
for which he would be personally responsible.”22 Pickering recog-
nized that not all acts committed by foreign officials are shielded by 
immunity, whether or not they ultimately result in liability – a 
point not lost on Letombe, who was forced to post bail in a differ-
ent proceeding. These historical examples cut against the argument 
                                                                                                
20 U.S. Samantar Brief at 10, quoting Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 
(1897), and citing 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 45 (1794); 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 81 (1797). 
21 See 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 45 (1794); 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 81 (1797). 
22 Letter from Pickering to Letombe (May 29, 1797), available at www.footnote. 
com/image/#6584593. 
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that foreign officials are entitled to blanket immunity from jurisdic-
tion for acts taken during their tenure office. 
“OFFICIAL ACTS” 
ot all acts performed by foreign officials are shielded by con-
duct-based immunity. The central challenge for the district 
court in Samantar on remand, and for courts in other cases, will be 
to determine which acts are entitled to immunity, and which acts 
are not.  
Foreign officials can perform different types of acts. At one end 
of the spectrum, foreign officials can perform “purely private” acts, 
which involve no actual or apparent exercise of state authority. 
Such acts are not attributable to the foreign state, and an aggrieved 
person will have recourse solely against the individual official. If the 
official is entitled to status-based immunity, the claimant will have 
to wait until the official has left office to pursue legal redress. (If the 
official is a current diplomat, he or she might be declared persona 
non grata and sent back to his or her home state.) If the individual 
official is not entitled to claim status-based immunity, he or she can 
be prosecuted or sued. Individual officials are not entitled to con-
duct-based immunity for their purely private acts. 
At the other end of the spectrum, foreign officials can perform 
“purely public” acts, which involve the actual exercise of state 
authority and entail no individual responsibility. An example of such 
an act might be signing a treaty. If the foreign state subsequently 
violates the treaty, an aggrieved party might have recourse against 
the state, but not against the individual. The individual official 
would be entitled to conduct-based immunity, both during his or 
her tenure in office, and after. Commercial activities are another 
example of acts that may be engaged in by individuals purely on 
behalf of a state. Foreign officials will generally not bear individual 
responsibility for such activities, and will thus be deemed immune 
from suit, even though the foreign state itself will not be immune 
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Many acts that violate international law, such as genocide, war 
crimes, and crimes against humanity, are neither “purely private” 
nor “purely public.” When foreign officials perform such acts, the 
acts will be attributable to the foreign state if they are performed 
with actual or apparent state authority.23 At the same time, such 
acts also entail individual responsibility under U.S. and/or interna-
tional law.24 As the International Law Commission has emphasized 
in elaborating principles of state responsibility, individual officials 
cannot “hide behind the State in respect of their own responsibility 
for conduct of theirs which is contrary to rules of international law 
which are applicable to them.”25 
Acting under the actual or apparent authority, or color of law, 
of a foreign state does not, by itself, entitle an individual defendant 
to conduct-based immunity from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts. 
For example, in 1841, the New York Supreme Court (the highest 
court of general jurisdiction sitting in New York at that time) re-
jected the claim to immunity of Alexander McLeod, a British sub-
ject and former deputy sheriff of the Niagara District in Upper Can-
ada who was implicated in the 1837 attack on the steamboat Caro-
line. McLeod had been arrested and charged with the crimes of ar-
son and murder, and civil claims were also brought against him. 
The court, which included future U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sam-
uel Nelson, held that Britain had not “placed the offenders above the  
 
                                                                                                
23 Article 7 of the non-binding Draft Articles on State Responsibility attributes 
conduct performed with apparent authority to the state. See International Law 
Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 
with Commentaries 46 (2001). Such attribution is “without prejudice to any ques-
tion of the individual responsibility under international law of any person acting 
on behalf of a State.” Id., Art. 58. 
24 For example, Congress has provided civil remedies for torture or extrajudicial 
killing by an individual defendant who acted “under actual or apparent authority, 
or color of law, of any foreign nation,” Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) 
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006)), and criminal penalties for torture 
committed “under the color of law,” including by a foreign official acting in a 
foreign country. 18 U.S.C. § 2340(1), 2340A(b)(2). 
25 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States, supra note 23, at 143. 
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law, and beyond our jurisdiction, by adopting and approving [the 
defendant’s] crime.”26 
Whether or not an act that is attributable both to the individual 
and to the state is entitled to conduct-based immunity depends in 
large part on the remedy sought. The Restatement (Second) of For-
eign Relations Law, which was current at the time the FSIA was 
enacted, provides for conduct-based immunity when “the effect of 
exercising jurisdiction [over the individual defendant] would be to 
enforce a rule of law against the state.”27 Reflecting this approach, 
other domestic courts have found immunity in civil suits against 
foreign officials when the court would have to determine ownership 
of a foreign state’s property or funds, or would have to order the 
foreign state to take specific action.28 
This remedy-centered approach is also consistent with U.S. do-
mestic jurisprudence under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, under which “the 
phrase ‘acting in their official capacities’ is best understood as a ref-
erence to the capacity in which the state officer is sued, not the ca-
pacity in which the officer inflicts the alleged injury.”29 The Su-
preme Court in Samantar explicitly referenced the domestic law 
analogy of an “official capacity” suit under § 1983 with a “ cf.” cita-
tion to illustrate the type of action that would not be “‘a suit against 
the official personally’” because the state would be the real party in 
interest. By contrast, when an aggrieved party sues a current or 
                                                                                                
26 People v. McLeod, 1 Hill 377, 25 Wend. 483 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1841). 
27 Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 66(f) 
(1965). The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations does not contain an analo-
gous section, although it does contain a note indicating that “a former head of 
state appears to have no immunity from jurisdiction to adjudicate.” Restatement 
(Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 464 n.14 (1987). 
28 See, for example, the cases discussed in the Brief of Professors of Public Interna-
tional Law and Comparative Law as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents in 
Samantar v. Yousuf, No. 08-1555, at 23-24; see also Keitner, Officially Immune?, 
supra note 3, at 5, 12.  
29 Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 26 (1991); but see Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. 
Goldsmith, Foreign Sovereign Immunity and Domestic Officer Suits, 13 GREEN BAG 2D 
137 (2009) (arguing against adopting this domestic model in suits against foreign 
officials). 
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former official “in his personal capacity and seeks damages from his 
own pockets,” the action is a suit against the official personally,30 
not a suit against the foreign state. Conduct-based immunity does 
not automatically preclude civil or criminal proceedings against a 
foreign official in a U.S. court if the alleged conduct entails individ-
ual responsibility under U.S. or international law.31 
THE ROLE OF THE EXECUTIVE 
isagreements persist about the appropriate role of the Execu-
tive Branch in immunity determinations. Courts should treat 
Executive representations about status-based immunity as conclu-
sive because they are a function of the Executive’s power under 
Article II, section 3 of the Constitution to accredit diplomats (“re-
ceive ambassadors”) and, by implication, to recognize foreign heads 
of state. When Panamanian General Manuel Noriega claimed head-
of-state immunity from prosecution for cocaine trafficking, the 
court of appeals appropriately noted that the Executive had never 
recognized Noriega as Panama’s legitimate head of state, and that 
“by pursuing Noriega’s capture and this prosecution, the Executive 
Branch has manifested its clear sentiment that Noriega should be 
denied head-of-state immunity.”32 In civil cases, the Executive can, 
and often does, express its views in the form of a “suggestion” of 
immunity or lack thereof. For example, in Mumtaz v. Ershad, the 
Executive at first suggested status-based immunity, but then with-
                                                                                                
30 Samantar, slip op. at 19. 
31 Whether a suit against a current or former foreign official would implicate the 
prudential Act of State doctrine is a separate and distinct question, and not one 
addressed in Samantar. The Act of State doctrine does not shield individual defen-
dants from jurisdiction, but it can provide a substantive defense on the merits. See 
id., slip op. at 16 (distinguishing between immunity and Act of State doctrine). 
32 United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir. 1997); see also U.S. 
Samantar Brief at 12 n.6 (noting that “[i]n choosing to prosecute a foreign official, 
the Executive Branch has necessarily determined that the official is not properly 
protected by immunity”); see also United States v. Emmanuel, 2007 WL 2002452 
at *12-13 (S.D. Fla., July 5, 2007) (rejecting immunity defense to prosecution 
under 18 U.S.C. § 2340 for torture in Liberia). 
D 
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drew its suggestion when the defendant resigned as President of 
Bangladesh.33  
Absolute deference to the Executive on questions of conduct-
based immunity has no equivalent constitutional basis, and would 
raise separation of powers concerns. Practice in this area is scant. As 
the Supreme Court noted in Samantar, pre-FSIA cases involving the 
immunity of individual foreign officials were “few and far be-
tween.”34 A compilation of the State Department’s immunity deci-
sions from 1952 to 1977 contains 110 decisions, only four of which 
involved the conduct-based immunity of individual defendants.35 In 
the first case, which predated the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations, the State Department suggested conduct-based immunity 
for a Canadian consular official who made statements to induce the 
plaintiff to emigrate to Canada.36 The district court found immu-
nity, citing both the State Department’s letter and an amicus brief 
filed by the Ambassador of Canada.37 In the second and third cases, 
the State Department suggested conduct-based immunity for Cana-
dian provincial officials for representations they made relating to 
the sale of securities owned by the Province of Newfoundland.38 It 
is not clear what became of the second case;39 in the third, the dis-
trict court found in an unreported decision that the provincial offi-
cials were immune from suit, and treated the State Department’s 
letter as binding.40 In the fourth case, the State Department de-
clined to suggest immunity; it is not clear what ultimately happened 
                                                                                                
33 See Notice of Changed Circumstances Submitted by the United States of America, 
Mumtaz v. Ershad, No. 74258/89 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. March 1991). 
34 Samantar, slip op. at 17; see also id. at 5 (describing process in cases involving 
seized vessels). 
35 Sovereign Immunity Decisions of the Department of State from May 1952 to 
January 1977 (M. Sandler, D. Vagts, & B. Ristau, eds.), in 1977 Dig. U.S. Prac. 
Int’l L. 1017, 1020. 
36 Id. at 1037. 
37 Waltier v. Thomson, 189 F. Supp. 319, 320 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). 
38 1977 Dig. U.S. Prac. Int’l L. at 1075-76. 
39 Semonian v. Crosbie, D. Mass. 1974 (no decision located).  
40 Greenspan v. Crosbie, 1976 WL 841 (S.D.N.Y.) at *2.  
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in the litigation.41  
There is thus no consistent, well-settled practice from which to 
infer a standard of absolute deference to the Executive on questions 
of conduct-based immunity. There is also a scant record from which 
to derive “the principles accepted” by the Executive as governing 
claims to conduct-based immunity when the State Department de-
clines to offer an opinion in a particular case.42 
The Executive has argued that it is entitled to absolute deference 
on questions of both status-based and conduct-based immunity 
based on cases involving foreign ships.43 These cases do not support 
a requirement of absolute deference in cases against foreign offi-
cials. In the 1926 Berizzi Brothers case, the U.S. Supreme Court 
found that the Italian steamship Pesaro was entitled to immunity 
even though it was a merchant ship and not a war ship, because it 
was owned and operated by the Italian government.44 In reaching 
this conclusion, the Court did not “mention, let alone give weight 
to, the fact that the Department of State had explicitly stated its 
view that the Pesaro was not entitled to immunity.”45 In 1942, the 
State Department recommended granting immunity to the Peruvian 
                                                                                                
41 1977 Dig. U.S. Prac. Int’l L. at 1062 (in Cole v. Heitman (S.D.N.Y. 1968), 
declining to suggest conduct-based immunity for alleged civil rights violations by 
the liaison officer of the British West Indies Central Labour Organization). 
42 See Heaney v. Spain, 445 F.2d 501, 503 n.2 (2d Cir. 1971) (stating that “we 
invited the State Department to submit its views on the questions presented by 
this case” but that “[t]he Department has not even acknowledged our letter”). The 
district court in Samantar faced the same dilemma. See Samantar, slip op. at 2 (in-
dicating that the district court stayed the proceedings for over two years to enable 
the State Department to provide a statement of interest, but the State Depart-
ment remained silent). 
43 U.S. Samantar Brief at 9, citing Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35 
(1945); Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 589 (1943). 
44 Berizzi Bros. Co. v. The Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926); see also Bradley & Gold-
smith, supra note 1, at 11 (indicating that “starting in the late 1930s, courts began 
to give essentially absolute deference to Executive Branch views on whether im-
munity should be granted”). 
45 Myres S. McDougal & William T. Burke, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS: A 
CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 146 (1962) (emphasis added). 
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steamship Ucayali, and transmitted that suggestion to the Attorney 
General, who instructed the U.S. Attorney to communicate the 
suggestion to the district court.46 This time, the Supreme Court 
stated in Ex parte Peru that “[u]pon recognition and allowance of the 
claim [to immunity] by the State Department and certification of its 
action presented to the court by the Attorney General, it is the 
court’s duty to surrender the vessel and remit the libelant to the 
relief obtainable through diplomatic negotiations.”47  
Two years after Ex parte Peru, the Supreme Court heard Republic 
of Mexico v. Hoffman, which also involved a foreign ship. The district 
court had reached a verdict denying the Baja California immunity 
after a trial on the merits, and the court of appeals had affirmed that 
verdict. The lower courts had found that the ship was not immune 
because, although the Mexican government held the title to the 
ship, the ship was not in the possession or public service of Mex-
ico.48 In Hoffman, the Supreme Court affirmed the finding of no 
immunity, and cited its recent holding in Ex parte Peru for the 
proposition that, if the State Department remains silent on the 
question of immunity, “the courts may decide for themselves 
whether all the requisites of immunity exist . . . in conformity to 
the principles accepted by the department of the government 
charged with the conduct of our foreign relations”49 The Court 
could readily identify the “principles accepted” by the State De-
partment in this context, because there was an extensive record of 
in rem admiralty proceedings denying immunity to ships that were 
owned but not possessed by foreign governments (reinforcing the 
principle that sovereign immunity only arises if the res is in the ac-
tual possession of the sovereign).50 By contrast, the State Depart-
                                                                                                
46 Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 581 (1943). 
47 Id. at 588. 
48 Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945). 
49 Id. at 34-35, citing Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588 (1943). The Court criti-
cized and distinguished its 1926 decision in the Berizzi Brothers case. Republic of 
Mexico, 324 U.S. at 36 n.1. 
50 See id. at 36 (“It has been held below, as in The Navemar, [303 U.S 68 (1938)], to 
be decisive of the case that the vessel when seized by judicial process was not in 
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ment has not yet articulated a clear set of principles for determining 
the scope of conduct-based immunity in suits against foreign offi-
cials who, unlike ships, may also be personally responsible for their 
conduct. 
In sum, although courts have deferred to Executive suggestions 
of status-based immunity for foreign officials, this does not compel 
the same level of deference to Executive suggestions of conduct-
based immunity from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts. 
 
here are many obstacles to civil suits against, and criminal 
prosecutions of, foreign officials for international law violations 





                                                                                                
the possession and service of the foreign government”).  
T 
